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Mortgage Modification and Strategic Behavior:
Evidence from a Legal Settlement with Countrywide †
By Christopher Mayer, Edward Morrison,
Tomasz Piskorski, and Arpit Gupta *
We investigate whether homeowners respond strategically to news
of mortgage modification programs. We exploit plausibly exogenous
variation in modification policy induced by settlement of US state
government lawsuits against Countrywide Financial Corporation,
which agreed to offer modifications to seriously delinquent borrowers. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we find that
Countrywide’s monthly delinquency rate increased more than
0.54 percentage points—a 10 percent relative increase—immediately after the settlement’s announcement. The estimated increase
in default rates is largest among borrowers least likely to default
otherwise. These results suggest that strategic behavior should be
an important consideration in designing mortgage modification programs. (JEL D14, G21, K22, R31)
Debt relief programs have a long history and have attracted renewed interest during the recent financial crisis, which has seen millions of US homeowners lose their
homes to foreclosure since 2007. The potential benefits and costs of these programs
are well known. During a crisis, mortgage debt relief can prevent excessive foreclosures, which yield losses for both borrowers and lenders and may also generate
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negative externalities for surrounding communities.1 Debt relief could also have
macroeconomic benefits to the extent that high household leverage depresses aggregate consumption and employment, as Mian and Sufi (2012) show. On the other
hand, debt relief can distort the incentives of homeowners, who may default on
mortgages in order to qualify for relief even though they could continue making
debt payments. Strategic behavior like this not only increases the cost of debt relief
programs to the lenders, but may also raise the long-run price of credit, if borrowers
and lenders anticipate future debt relief programs.
Despite the economic importance of debt relief programs, there is little empirical
evidence on their effects. This paper presents evidence on their costs. We study a
recent mortgage modification program with a simple eligibility criterion—borrowers in default qualified—and estimate the extent to which the program affected borrower incentives to default.
Our focus is motivated by a key trade-off in the design of debt relief programs.
In principle, a cost-effective program should apply eligibility criteria that efficiently
identify homeowners who are highly likely to default unless they receive relief.
In practice, it is costly and difficult to identify these at-risk homeowners because
homeowner default decisions can depend on hard-to-observe factors such as their
financial ability to service debt, private valuation of their homes, and personal
default costs.
One approach to the problem is to offer benefits only to homeowners who complete a rigorous audit that verifies that they are likely to default, or have defaulted, as
a result of meaningful adverse conditions.2 Such an audit, for example, would assess
the home’s value and the homeowner’s current income and credit rating. Because
this approach can be time-consuming and can induce screening costs, it may fail to
extend benefits to homeowners before they enter foreclosure or decide to exit their
homes, and could thereby lead to higher costs for borrowers, lenders, and surrounding communities. An alternative way to target modification benefits is to extend
help only to homeowners who are delinquent.3 While this approach is possibly
quicker and less expensive in terms of screening costs, it could induce homeowners
to default in order to obtain modification benefits. Such induced defaults can raise
the costs of these programs for lenders because the borrowers may have continued
repaying their loans without any concessions.
A key factor affecting this trade-off, at least from the perspective of lenders (or
mortgage investors), is the extent to which simple delinquency requirements encourage borrowers to default on their loans. This has been an open empirical question
1
Several papers explore the potential benefits of debt relief to both borrowers and lenders during adverse economic conditions, including Bolton and Rosenthal (2002); Kroszner (2003); and Piskorski and Tchistyi (2011).
Because foreclosures may exert significant negative externalities (see, for example, Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak
2011 and Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 2011), it may be socially optimal to modify mortgage contracts to a greater extent
than lenders would select independently.
2
An example of this approach is the Home Affordable Modification Program, introduced in March 2009, which
contains multiple eligibility requirements, along with a trial period preceding any permanent modification (see
Agarwal et al. 2012).
3
For example, a number of recent modification programs have made benefits available to homeowners who
failed to make at least two monthly mortgage payments (e.g., the Bank of America/Countrywide Modification
Program). Other programs, like the IndyMac/FDIC Program, JP Chase Enhanced Program, Citi Homeownership
Preservation Program, and GSE Streamlined Modification Program have also targeted seriously delinquent borrowers, though some include additional eligibility requirements. See Citigroup (2009).
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as mortgage default can result in additional costs for the borrower. Seriously delinquent borrowers, for example, face higher costs of accessing credit in the future.
Additionally, bounded rationality or moral considerations may further decrease the
ability and willingness of borrowers to default on their loans to profit from debt
relief polices (see, for example, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2013).
To investigate this question, we focus on a legal settlement with Countrywide
Financial Corporation. In October 2008, Countrywide announced that it had settled
suits filed by US state attorneys general. It agreed to extend offers of loan modifications, beginning December 2008, to all borrowers who had Countrywide-serviced
subprime mortgages and were at least 60 days past due on payments. Three features
of the Countrywide settlement—its unexpected public announcement in advance
of its implementation, nationwide coverage, and the requirement that a borrower
be delinquent in order to receive benefits—make it a potentially useful setting for
assessing borrower behavior in response to the offer of mortgage modification featuring a simple delinquency requirement.
We examine strategic behavior after the Countrywide announcement using
loan-level data matched to borrower credit histories. We say that a borrower exhibits
“strategic behavior” if he or she defaults in response to public announcement of the
settlement and would not have defaulted otherwise, at least in the near term. We
focus on a particular measure of the default rate: the rate at which previously-current
borrowers miss two payments in a row. These borrowers are said to “roll straight”
from current to 60 days delinquent. We focus on this measure of default—the “rollover rate”—because the Countrywide program targeted borrowers who were at least
60 days delinquent. In a difference-in-difference framework, we estimate the change
in this delinquency rate among Countrywide borrowers during the months immediately following the settlement announcement relative to the change during the
same period among comparable borrowers who were unaffected by the settlement
because their loans were not serviced by Countrywide.
We find that the settlement induced a 0.54 percentage point increase in the
monthly rollover rate among Countrywide borrowers—a 10 percent increase
relative to the pre-settlement rate (4.8 percent)—during the three months immediately after the settlement announcement. The effect of the settlement is even
larger—a 16 to 18 percent increase relative to the pre-settlement rollover rate—
when we subset on borrowers with (i) substantial available credit through credit
cards and (ii) lower current combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratios. These borrowers were arguably less likely to default in the near term because they had
significant untapped liquidity through credit cards or some positive equity in
their homes.
We confirm that these results are not driven by idiosyncratic features of
Countrywide loans or borrowers. Although we observe an increase in relative
default rates among Countrywide loans targeted by the settlement (subprime first
lien mortgages), we do not observe an increase in relative default rates among
loans not targeted by the settlement. Default rates on credit cards and second
mortgages held by Countrywide borrowers did not increase relative to default
rates among control group borrowers. Nor do we observe an increase in relative default rates among non-subprime fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) held by
Countrywide borrowers.

VOL. 104 NO. 9

mayer et al.: mortgage modification and strategic behavior

2833

Together, these results inform ongoing discussions about the trade-off between
quickly implemented programs with simple but possibly manipulable eligibility criteria and slowly implemented programs with more rigorous verification of
homeowner distress. Further research is needed to determine whether the costs of
strategic behavior are large relative to the potential benefits of a simple modification
program that quickly extends benefits to a large number of homeowners.
Previous studies of incentives and strategic behavior in the context of the recent
crisis have examined a number of questions, including the impact of bailouts and
regulatory design on banks’ incentives to take risk,4 the likelihood that some lenders originated mortgages with greater risk due to their ability to sell the loans in
the securitization market,5 and the impact of securitization on servicer decisions to
foreclose or renegotiate delinquent loans.6 Little attention has been given so far to
strategic behavior among homeowners.
Our analysis is also broadly connected to the household finance literature, surveyed by Campbell (2006) and Tufano (2009), especially the recent empirical
literature examining household motives behind mortgage defaults. Most of this
recent literature aims to assesses the relative importance of two key drivers of
mortgage default: negative equity and illiquidity.7 Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
(2013) also explore how moral and social considerations affect the decision to
default on a mortgage. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to
assess the effect of mortgage modification programs on incentives to default on
a mortgage. Our paper is also related to the empirical literature examining the
effects of various policies on household behavior, such as the impact of unemployment insurance on workers’ incentives to work.8 We contribute to this literature by
examining the effects of mortgage modification policy on borrowers’ incentives
to repay their loans. Finally, our paper helps inform the empirical literature on
contract renegotiation.9
The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section I we describe the
Countrywide settlement and our hypotheses regarding its effects on homeowner
behavior. Sections II and III describe our data and empirical methodology. We present our results in Section IV and discuss their implications for mortgage modification policies in Section V.

See Farhi and Tirole (2012) and Poole (2009), for example, for the analysis of bailouts. See Agarwal et al.
(forthcoming) who examine differences between federal and state regulators and their impact on banks’ decisions.
5
Mian and Sufi (2009); Keys, et al. (2010); Keys, Seru, and Vig (2012); Rajan, Seru, and Vig (2010); Berndt and
Gupta (2009); and Purnanandam (2011) provide evidence suggesting that originators might have made riskier loans
when they were able to securitize these loans.
6
Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2010) show that bank-held delinquent loans were foreclosed at a lower rate relative
to comparable mortgages that were securitized. Agarwal et al. (2011) corroborate their findings and provide further
evidence that bank-held loans were much more likely to be renegotiated than comparable securitized mortgages.
7
See, among others, Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008); Cohen-Cole and Morse (2010); and Elul et al. (2010).
See also Mian and Sufi (2011) who examine the role of the home equity-based borrowing channel in the recent
crisis using a dataset consisting of individual credit files.
8
See, for example, Meyer (1990) and Krueger and Meyer (2002).
9
See, among others, recent research by Benmelech and Bergman (2008) and Roberts and Sufi (2009) in the
context of corporate default, and Matvos (2013) for renegotiation in NFL football contracts.
4
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I. Countrywide Settlement and Hypotheses

A. The Settlement
In June 2008, attorneys general in California and Illinois sued Countrywide, alleging deceptive lending practices. The California complaint, for example, alleged that
Countrywide had “implemented [a] deceptive scheme through misleading marketing
practices designed to sell risky and costly loans to homeowners, the terms and dangers of which they did not understand.”10 Over the next three months, similar suits
were brought by attorneys general in over 30 other states.
On October 6, 2008, Countrywide entered a multi-state settlement, pursuant to
which it agreed to extend offers of loan modification to all seriously delinquent
or near-delinquent subprime first-mortgage loans11 that it services throughout
the nation.12 It was irrelevant whether the loan was originated by Countrywide,
whether it was securitized or held in Countrywide’s portfolio,13 whether it previously received a modification, or whether the borrower’s home was encumbered by
a second mortgage or junior lien.
The settlement targeted subprime first mortgages serviced by Countrywide, including hybrid ARMs and Option ARMs. To qualify for modification, the mortgage and
borrower had to satisfy four criteria: The loan must have been originated before
2008 and have been within Countrywide’s servicing portfolio on June 30, 2008; the
borrower’s loan-to-value ratio (LTV) must be at least 75 percent; payments of principal or interest must be 60 or more days delinquent (or likely to become delinquent
as a result of an interest rate reset or negative amortization trigger); and the borrower’s post-modification mortgage payments must not exceed certain thresholds.
The program was scheduled to last until June 30, 2012.
With respect to subprime hybrid ARMs, which are the primary focus of this paper,
seriously delinquent borrowers would be considered for unsolicited restoration of
the introductory interest rate for five years. Additionally, all seriously delinquent
Hybrid ARM borrowers would be considered for some type of fully-amortizing loan
modification. One type would reduce the interest rate for five years (to as low as
3.5 percent), after which the loan would be converted to an FRM at a low rate.
Countrywide agreed to be proactive in contacting borrowers eligible for modifications under the settlement. Although it made this commitment on October 6, 2008,
it announced that it would not be ready to contact borrowers during the first few
See State of California (2008a) and State of Illinois (2008).
The settlement defined a subprime first mortgage as one that “is identified as such in connection with a securitization in which it is part of the pool of securitized assets or, in the case of a [Countrywide] Residential Mortgage
Loan that is not included in a securitization, was classified as being ‘subprime’ on the systems of [Countrywide] and
its subsidiaries on June 30, 2008. ‘Subprime Mortgage Loans’ do not include first-lien residential mortgage loans
that are Federal Eligible.” See Countrywide Financial Corporation (2008).
12
A summary of the settlement is provided by a “Multistate Settlement Term Sheet” (see Countrywide Financial
Corporation 2008). More detailed terms are provided by State of California (2008b), among other sources.
13
Although securitization agreements often limit the servicer’s authority to modify mortgages (see Mayer,
Morrison, and Piskorski 2009 and Piskorski, Seru, and Vig 2010), Countrywide stated, “it currently has, or reasonably expects to obtain, discretion to pursue the foreclosure avoidance measures outlined in this agreement for the
substantial majority of Qualifying Mortgages. Where [Countrywide] does not enjoy discretion to pursue these foreclosure avoidance measures, [Countrywide] will use its best effort to seek appropriate authorization from investors.”
See Countrywide Financial Corporation (2008).
10
11
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Figure 1. Internet Searches for “Countrywide Modification”
Notes: This figure plots an index of the weekly volume of Internet searches for the term
“Countrywide Modification,” as reported by Google Trends. Searches for this term spiked on
October 6, 2008 the day the Countrywide settlement was announced and reported by newspapers around the country.

months of the program. Countrywide also agreed to temporarily suspend the foreclosure process for any borrower eligible for modification.
B. Public Awareness of the Settlement
The Countrywide settlement was widely reported in early October 2008, prior to
its nationwide rollout in December 2008. Figure 1 documents the sudden interest in
the settlement during this period: As reported by Google Trends, Internet searches
for the term “Countrywide Modification” spiked in October, as newspapers around
the country announced the settlement. Search activity dramatically increased just
after this date.
Internet discussion forums also show that at least some Countrywide borrowers
were aware that the settlement targeted borrowers who were at least 60 days delinquent. In one forum, borrowers report that they were in touch with Countrywide as
early as October 2008 regarding their eligibility and were told that benefits were
available to borrowers who were 60 days delinquent. Some forum participants also
indicate that they responded to the settlement by missing mortgage payments in
order to qualify for benefits.14
14

The information reported in this paragraph is drawn from comments posted at http://loanworkout.org/2009/02/
countrywide-idiots/. This site includes statements such as: “We started the process back in Oct of 2008. We have
an ARM with a 8.75 percent rate currently. We have applied for a rate reductions but were told we would have
to be delinquent on our account to qualify.” “We received a loan modification agreement in December, but this
was after we were told not to make a mortgage payment, because if we made a payment and we were current we
would not qualify.” “In order to get the help we were requesting, we had to go from having an excellent pay history
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Countrywide was aware of the potential for strategic behavior. Its settlement
included a provision stating that, if it “detects material levels of intentional nonperformance by borrowers that appears to be attributable to the introduction of the
loan modification program, it reserves the right to require objective prequalification
of borrowers for loan modifications under the program and to take other reasonable steps.” It appears that this provision was not widely reported and may not have
deterred some homeowners from strategically defaulting on their mortgages in order
to qualify for modifications.
C. Hypotheses
We view the settlement as an opportunity to assess homeowner response to sudden
announcement of a modification policy using simple but manipulable qualification
criteria. Most of our analysis focuses on 2/28 ARMs, a type of loan primarily targeted by the settlement and very common among subprime borrowers (see Mayer,
Pence, and Sherlund 2009). These mortgages offer an introductory “teaser” rate
for the first two years, after which the rate resets to a possibly higher level for the
remaining 28 years of the loan term.
Assuming the announcement was an exogenous shock—an assumption we justify in the next section—we propose the following differences-in-differences (DD)
estimation strategy: Relative to the same type of mortgages held by comparable borrowers and serviced by other servicers, were Countrywide 2/28 ARMs more likely
to “roll straight” from current to 60 days delinquent—i.e., abruptly stop payment
for two months—during the period immediately after public announcement of the
settlement? By abruptly stopping payment, homeowners could make themselves
eligible for the benefits of the settlement.
We test for this DD effect beginning in October 2008, the month of the settlement announcement. There is, however, a potential confound beginning in early
2009. In February of that year the federal government announced plans to implement a widespread modification program, the Home Affordable Mortgage Plan
(HAMP), which went online in March 2009. It is a potential confound because its
effect on Countrywide borrowers, who may have already applied for or obtained
modifications pursuant to the Countrywide settlement, may differ from its effect
on non-Countrywide borrowers. Additionally, Countrywide borrowers may have
suspended their response to the settlement because they expected the forthcoming federal program to be more generous.15 To avoid this potential confound, we
focus our analysis on the behavior of borrowers during the first few months after
the settlement announcement (October 2008 to February 2009), paying particular
attention to their behavior during the first quarter of the program (October 2008 to
December 2009).

to completely tarnishing our record by missing two months of payments … so we skipped our payments for two
months.” “We would not even be behind if they did not advise us to enter into the loan modification and not send
any payments in until it was approved or denied!”
15
The HAMP guidelines do not have any specific requirement that a loan must to be delinquent to be eligible.
In fact, the program provides additional financial incentives to servicers to modify loans that are currently making
payments (but are at risk of default in the future). See Agarwal et al. (2012).

VOL. 104 NO. 9

mayer et al.: mortgage modification and strategic behavior

2837

To be sure, the settlement announcement may have convinced some borrowers
to default slightly earlier than they would have otherwise. These defaults are not
strategic because the borrowers were already distressed and likely to default. To
assess whether economic distress—rather than strategic behavior—is driving excess
post-settlement defaults among Countrywide borrowers (relative to the control
group), we examine the behavior of homeowners who were least likely to default
when the settlement was announced: (i) homeowners with substantial available
credit on their credit cards (equal to at least five times their monthly mortgage payment) and (ii) homeowners with relatively low current CLTV ratios. Because these
homeowners had access to significant amounts of additional liquidity, or might have
had positive home equity, they were less likely to default in the absence of a modification program, at least in the near future. If we observe a relative rise in rollover
rates among these homeowners, we think it is suggestive of strategic behavior by
those impacted by the settlement, rather than changes in other economic factors that
might be coincident with announcement of the settlement.
As an additional test of strategic behavior, we examine the behavior of homeowners with respect to debts that were not targeted by the settlement, including
second mortgages and credit cards. If strategic behavior—not economic distress—
induced excess defaults on Countrywide subprime first mortgages, we do not expect
to observe excess defaults (relative to the control group) with respect to nontargeted
debts during the period immediately after the settlement announcement.
Finally, we consider the behavior of borrowers with FRMs. While hybrid ARMs
are a risky mortgage product usually targeted at subprime borrowers, FRMs are
a more conventional mortgage product that are often taken out by more creditworthy (non-subprime) borrowers who would not have qualified for modification under the settlement. Hence, we do not expect to observe a response among
non-subprime FRMs. We can therefore assess whether the post-settlement increase
in Countrywide’s rollover rate (relative to the control group) reflects strategic behavior among targeted borrowers (those with hybrid ARMs) or just a generalized rise in
default rates across all Countrywide borrowers, including nontargeted homeowners
(those with non-subprime FRMs).
II. Data

We use a match between two databases: (i) loan-level mortgage data collected
by BlackBox Logic and (ii) borrower-level credit report information collected by
Equifax. BlackBox is a private company that provides a comprehensive, dynamic
dataset with information about 21 million privately securitized subprime, Alt-A,
and prime loans originated after 1999. These loans account for about 90 percent of
all privately securitized mortgages from that period. The BlackBox data, which are
obtained from mortgage servicers and securitization trustees, include static information taken at the time of origination, such as mortgage date and amount, FICO
credit score, servicer name, interest rate, term, and interest rate type. The BlackBox
data also include dynamic data on monthly payments, mortgage balances, and delinquency status.
Equifax is a credit reporting agency that provides monthly data on borrowers’
current credit scores, payments and balances on mortgage and installment debt, and
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b alances and credit utilization for revolving debt (such as credit cards and HELOCs).
Equifax reports the “Vantage” credit score, which is comparable to FICO and ranges
from 501 to 990.
The match between BlackBox and Equifax data was performed by 1010Data, a
provider of data warehousing and processing, using a proprietary match algorithm.
We impose four restrictions on the merged BlackBox-Equifax data in order to create
a “base sample.” First, we restrict the data to the types of loans that might have been
eligible for the Countrywide settlement, namely first-lien mortgages on residential
properties that were the owners’ primary residences. First-liens were identified as
loans with the following characteristics in the BlackBox dataset: (i) a lien type of
“first” and (ii) a current or origination mortgage balance that was within 5 percent
of the current or origination balance reported for the largest two first mortgages in
the Equifax dataset. Second, we retain only loans that were originated during 2005,
2006, and the first half of 2007 because we have access to Equifax data covering
these originations. Third, we exclude mortgages with an origination LTV less than
seventy. Borrowers with lower LTVs are unlikely to have been subprime borrowers at the time of origination. Finally, we exclude mortgages serviced by Citibank,
IndyMac, and J.P. Morgan, all of which implemented modification programs around
the time that the settlement was announced. We are interested in comparing the
behavior of Countrywide borrowers to that of similar borrowers who were not
offered modification benefits around the time of the announcement. After imposing
these restrictions, we obtain a base sample that includes more than 500,000 2/28
ARMs and more than 700,000 FRMs.
Although 1010Data was able to link nearly all BlackBox mortgages to Equifax
credit reports, we took steps to reduce the likelihood of poor-quality linkages by
creating a “matched sample” on which we perform all analysis involving Equifax
covariates. We exclude from the matched sample any observation for which the
borrower zip code reported in Equifax does not match the property zip code in the
BlackBox dataset. This exclusion omits mismatched loans at the level of zip code
and provides additional verification that owner-occupants held the loans in our sample.16 Due to these restrictions, the matched sample is smaller than the base sample
and includes more than 300,000 2/28 ARMs and more than 450,000 FRMs.
Because the Equifax data include information about current balances on other
junior mortgages held by the borrower, we are able to compute an initial combined
loan-to-value (CLTV) ratio for each property. We can then estimate current CLTV at
any point of time using zip-level home price indices provided by Zillow.17
In the analysis below, we report results both for the full base sample as well as the
smaller matched sample. Variables provided by Equifax are used as covariates only
in the matched sample.

16
We have conducted an extensive comparison of merge quality between the datasets in the matched sample,
checking fields such as dynamic payment history, origination balance, and origination dates. We find that these
fields match very closely across the two databases, providing additional verification of merge quality.
17
For both the base and matched samples, we use the MAPLE/Geocorr2k engine provided by the Missouri
Census to link property zip code to metropolitan statistical areas. We compute the current CLTV of a loan as a
ratio of combined outstanding loan balances to the current estimated house value (a house price at loan origination
indexed by cumulative change of zip code house price index).
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III. Methodology

We estimate a probit specification of the following form:
 ) = Φ(CWit   β + Oct-Decit  μ + CWit  Oct-Decit  δ + x  ′it   γ).
(1) Pr (Yit= 1 | Currentit−2
The dependent variable is the probability that a mortgage becomes 60 days past
due in month t (Yit= 1), conditional upon being current 60 days (two months) earlier (Currentit−2). We call this the “rollover rate”: the rate at which borrowers “roll
straight” from current to 60 days delinquent. It is our primary dependent variable
for three reasons: (i) the settlement targeted borrowers who were at least 60 days
delinquent; (ii) evidence of strategic behavior is more compelling if we observe an
abrupt increase in defaults among borrowers who were current on payments prior
to the settlement announcement; and (iii) by conditioning on loans that were previously current, we study transition rates among a relatively homogeneous group of
loans. We confirm, however, that our results are similar when we consider a standard
hazard model (see Section IVE).
In the above specification, CWit is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the loan is
serviced by Countrywide. Oct-Decitis another dummy, equaling 1 if month t occurs
during the period October through December 2008. October 2008 is the first month
during which we could observe a borrower response to announcement of the settlement on October 6, 2008.18 xit is a vector of loan and borrower characteristics that
includes variables such as initial Vantage score and the change in Vantage score from
origination to the current period, initial and current CLTV, origination quarter, initial
and current interest rate, loan balance, controls for date of reset, dummies for each
quarter before and after the settlement announcement, interactions between these
time dummies and the Countrywide indicator (CWit), and a constant term. Standard
errors are clustered by mortgage, but we confirm that we obtain comparable results
when they are clustered by location (MSA) of the property backing the loan.19
In baseline models, we estimate the above specification on monthly data from July
2007 through February 2009. July 2007 roughly marks the start of the subprime crisis and the end of both subprime originations and the opportunity to refinance such
mortgages. Thus, all mortgages in our study have been originated by July 2007.20
This allows us to focus on a simple transition of mortgages from current status to
default.21 We end our analysis period in February 2009 to avoid the potential confound arising from HAMP, but our core results do not change when we extend our
analysis to include periods after February 2009 (see Section IVE).
The key coefficient of interest is δ, which measures the difference-in-differences—
the estimated change in the difference between Countrywide and control group
18
Our data record the payment status of the borrower as of the end of a given month. For example, a borrower
who is 30 days delinquent in September will be recorded as being 60 days delinquent in October if no new payments
were received by the end of October.
19
See Tables A.3 and A.4 in the online Appendix.
20
The majority of mortgages enter our data during 2006 and the first half of 2007.
21
A competing hazard model would be needed for data prior to July 2007. Such a model would be more complex
to implement because distressed borrowers could use the refinancing option as an alternative to default. Moreover,
the model might need to account for a possible structural shift in parameter values after the collapse of the subprime
refinancing market in 2007.
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Table 1—Summary Statistics for 2/28 ARMs
Countrywide
Number of loans

Control group

43,418

203,960

Mean

sd

Mean

sd

Panel A. BlackBox variables
Initial CLTV
Initial interest rate
Current interest rate
Origination FICO
Origination balance
Low/no doc
Refi
Cash out refi

92
8.18
8.63
618
196
0.42
0.055
0.39

8.8
1.28
1.35
54
114
0.49
0.23
0.49

90
8.07
8.56
617
206
0.6
0.1
0.37

8.9
1.24
1.37
56.3
133
0.49
0.3
0.48

Panel B. Equifax variables
Current CLTV
Current Vantage
2nd lien balance
Has junior lien
Credit utilization

121
667
47.9
0.44
0.47

28
82
31.4
0.5
0.37

119
666
52.4
0.38
0.47

28
84
38.4
0.48
0.37

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for 2/28 adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) serviced by Countrywide and the control group in the matched sample as of September 2008. The
summary statistics include characteristics of these loans at origination and as of September
2008, the month before public announcement of the settlement on October 6, 2008. CLTV
and interest rates are reported in percentage terms; loan balances are in thousands of dollars.

rollover rates during the quarter immediately after the settlement announcement
(Oct–Dec 2008) relative to the first quarter in our analysis period (Jul–Sep 2007).
We omit the first quarter of our sample because our empirical model includes interactions between the Countrywide dummy and time dummies for each quarter (or twomonth period) prior to and after the settlement. The coefficients for these interactions
trace out the time path of differences between Countrywide and control group delinquency rates. By choosing the first quarter as the omitted category, we make it easier
to detect differential trends in pre-settlement delinquency rates. This is important
because our identification assumption is that, in the absence of the settlement, observationally similar Countrywide and control group mortgages would display similar
default patterns (up to a constant difference) during the period of study.
A. Comparability of Countrywide and Control Group Loans
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the stock of 2/28 ARMs at loan origination and in September 2008, the month before public announcement of the settlement. Measured at means, Countrywide and control group loans are comparable:
origination and current CLTV differ by at most 2 percentage points, origination and
current interest rates differ by at most 11 basis points, and origination FICO and current Vantage differ by at most 1 point. Origination balances differ by about $10,000,
less than 10 percent of the standard deviation. Available utilization on credit cards is
measured as a fraction of the total credit limit available on all credit cards that have
been used by the borrower. Table 1 shows similar levels of credit card utilization
across the two groups of loans.
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Panel B. Vantage
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Figure 2. Comparability of Countrywide and Control Group:
Kernel Density of Observables, July 2007
Notes: This figure shows the kernel density plots as of July 2007 for mortgage interest rate (panel A), Vantage credit
score (panel B), and CLTV (panel C) for 2/28 ARMs in the matched sample. The solid line shows the Countrywide
loans while the dashed line shows the corresponding values for mortgages in the control group.

Figures 2 and 3 show kernel density plots, comparing the distributions of loan terms
for Countrywide and control group loans at two points in time—at the beginning of
our sample (July 2007) and during the month before the settlement announcement
(September 2008). The distribution of loan characteristics is virtually identical for
the two groups in July 2007, but in September 2008 we see a difference in the tails:
Countrywide mortgages include a slightly greater proportion of higher-risk loans as
manifested by their high CLTVs and interest rates.
We explore our identifying assumption further for 2/28 ARMs by tracking the
evolution by month of current interest rates, Vantage scores, and CLTV among 2/28
ARMs (see Figure A.1 in the online Appendix). Measured at means, Countrywide
and control group loans display current interest rates, Vantage scores, and CLTVs
that generally track each other closely prior to the settlement announcement.22
However, some differences emerge in the last few months before the announcement. Most notably, a difference in current CLTV begins to emerge in the last few
22
We also verify that default rates among Countrywide and control group loans follow similar trends prior to
our estimation period (July 2007 through February 2009). Between mid-2006 and mid-2007 about 7.2 percent of
Countrywide and 7.6 percent of control group loans had entered default (Figure A.2 in the online Appendix).
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Figure 3. Comparability of Countrywide and Control Group:
Kernel Density of Observables, September 2008
Notes: This figure shows the kernel density plots as of September 2008 for mortgage interest rate (panel A), Vantage
credit score (panel B), and CLTV (panel C) for 2/28 ARMs in the matched sample. The solid line shows the
Countrywide loans while the dashed line shows the corresponding values for mortgages in the control group.

months before the announcement. This is consistent with Figure 3, which shows
that Countrywide loans include a greater proportion of loans with extreme-valued
CLTVs just before the settlement announcement.
We obtain similar inferences for non-subprime FRMs (see Table A1 in the online
Appendix). We define a loan as non-subprime if the borrower’s origination FICO
was more than 620.23 Non-subprime FRMs are comparable across most dimensions,
including origination and current CLTV, origination FICO and current Vantage, origination balance, and credit card utilization. Some differences exist with respect to interest rates, with average interest rate being 30 basis points lower for Countrywide loans.
Overall, this analysis shows that the mean characteristics of Countrywide and control group were comparable prior to the settlement, but that Countrywide loans have
a relatively larger share of risky tail loans. This reflects the fact that Countrywide
loans include a greater proportion of mortgages that were originated in areas where
house prices declined most steeply during the crisis and that were often extended to
23
Subprime status is difficult to define because there is no single agreed-upon definition. In order to be conservative, we define an FRM as non-subprime if the borrower’s origination FICO was greater than 620, a common
threshold for subprime status. Most lenders define a borrower as subprime if the borrower’s FICO credit score is
below 620 on a scale that ranges from 300 to 850. This is also how the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
defines subprime status in their mortgage metrics reports (see Keys et al. 2010).
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high-risk borrowers, as reflected by their higher interest rates. Because some variation in default rates between Countrywide and control group loans could be due to
differences in the mix of mortgages originated, we include a wide range of controls
for loan, borrower, and regional characteristics in the regressions reported below.
We also test whether our results vary when we subset on a relatively homogeneous
subset of loans that excludes high-risk mortgages.24
IV. Results

A. Evolution of Default Rates
Figure 4 plots the average monthly rollover rate for Countrywide and control
group loans during the five quarters preceding the settlement announcement, the
quarter just after the announcement (Oct–Dec 2008), and the Jan–Feb 2009 period.
Panel A examines all loans. Panel B subsets on low utilization borrowers, defined as
those who had sufficiently large liquidity available to them through credit cards that
they could charge the equivalent of five or more months of mortgage payments when
they become delinquent on their mortgages. Panel C subsets on borrowers whose
mortgages had a CLTV less then 100 percent at the time of their delinquency. These
low credit utilization and low CLTV borrowers were arguably less likely to default
in the near term because they had significant untapped liquidity through their credit
cards or some positive equity in their homes.
Panel A of Figure 4 shows a significant increase in the rollover rate of Countrywide
loans relative to the control group during the Oct–Dec 2008 period, the first quarter
during which we could observe an effect of the settlement announcement. However,
we also observe an increase in the rollover rate of Countrywide loans relative to the
control group during the quarter immediately preceding the settlement announcement. This pre-settlement increase is somewhat less evident when we subset on
low utilization borrowers in panel B. When we consider low CLTV borrowers in
panel C, we observe a substantial post-settlement increase in Countrywide’s rollover rate relative to the control group, but no visible pre-settlement difference.
The patterns in Figure 4 suggest that the differential pre-settlement increase in
Countrywide’s default rate is driven by high-risk loans, which are more concentrated
in the Countrywide group (as Figure 3 showed). We explore this possibility by subsetting on Countrywide and control group loans with CLTVs, interest rates, and credit
scores that were within one standard deviation of the corresponding Countrywide
means during each month of the pre-settlement period. By trimming our sample in
this way, we subset on relatively homogeneous loans and exclude high-risk loans
with extreme characteristics. We observe no differential pre-settlement default patterns in this sample, but continue to find that Countrywide’s rollover rate increased
24
It might be thought that unobservable differences are potentially important because Countrywide was sued
while other mortgage lenders and servicers were not. However, evidence presented by Lacko and Pappalardo (2007)
suggests that Countrywide’s lending practices may not have differed substantially from those of other institutions.
It appears that Countrywide was sued by state attorneys general because it was the largest originator and servicer
of subprime mortgages and was still solvent at the time of the lawsuits (earlier in 2008, it had been acquired by
Bank of America). Other originators, such as New Century and IndyMac, had already collapsed and either filed for
bankruptcy or been placed into receivership by the federal government.

2844

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

Panel B. Low credit utilization

Panel A. All loans
0.1

0.1

0.09

0.09

0.08

0.08

0.07

0.07

0.06

0.06

0.05

0.05

0.04

0.04

0.03

0.03

0.02

0.02

0.01

0.01

0

September 2014

Jul–Sep Oct–Dec Jan–Mar Apr–Jun Jul–Sep Oct–Dec Jan–Feb
2007
2007
2008
2008
2008
2008
2009

0

Jul–Sep Oct–Dec Jan–Mar Apr–Jun Jul–Sep Oct–Dec Jan–Feb
2007
2007
2008
2008
2008
2008
2009

Panel C. CLTV < 100
0.1

0.09
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0

Jul–Sep Oct–Dec Jan–Mar Apr–Jun Jul–Sep Oct–Dec Jan–Feb
2007
2007
2008
2008
2008
2008
2009

Figure 4. Evolution of Default Rates for 2/28 ARMs: Countrywide and Control Group
Notes: This figure plots the average monthly rollover rate (the 60-day delinquency rate among borrowers who were
current two months before) during each of the five quarters preceding the settlement announcement, the quarter
just after the announcement (Oct–Dec 2008), and the Jan–Feb 2009 period. Panel A plots the rate for all the loans,
panel B subsets on borrowers with low credit utilization, and panel C subsets on borrowers whose mortgages had a
CLTV less than 100 percent at the time of delinquency. The solid line shows the rollover rate for Countrywide loans
while the dashed line shows the corresponding rate for mortgages in the control group.

s ubstantially relative to the control group immediately after the settlement announcement (see Figure A.3 in the online Appendix). We also observe that Countrywide’s
mean rollover rate reverts to the control group rate in early 2009.
This evidence suggests that the settlement induced an increase in Countrywide’s
default rate and that the increase is concentrated in the first quarter immediately following the settlement announcement. Moreover, it indicates that differential patterns
in pre-settlement mean default rates are driven by high-risk loans that are more heavily concentrated in the Countrywide group. These patterns largely disappear, while
the effect of the settlement persists, when we account for these high-risk tail loans.
B. Baseline Model of Settlement Effects
Table 2 implements equation (1) for 2/28 ARMs. Column 1 estimates the model
using the full base sample, but includes minimal controls—time dummies, a
Countrywide dummy, and interactions between the Countrywide and time dummies.
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Table 2—Default Specification for 2/28 ARMs

Countrywide × Oct–Dec 2007
Countrywide × Jan–Mar 2008
Countrywide × Apr–Jun 2008
Countrywide × Jul–Sep 2008
Countrywide × Oct–Dec 2008
Countrywide × Jan–Feb 2009
Countrywide
Origination quarter
BlackBox control
MSA control
Reset control
Equifax control
Number of cases
Avg. delinquency 2008:III
Average share Countrywide
Countrywide × (2008:IV–2008:III)
Wald Test ( p-value)

Base sample
(1)

Base sample
(2)

No
No
No
No
No

−0.0012**
(0.0005)
−0.0003
(0.0005)
−0.0004
(0.0005)
0.0056***
(0.0006)
0.0160***
(0.0007)
0.0092***
(0.0008)
−0.0002
(0.0004)

−0.0005
(0.0005)
−0.0008
(0.0005)
−0.0022***
(0.0005)
−0.0003
(0.0005)
0.0052***
(0.0006)
0.0001
(0.0007)
0.0016***
(0.0003)

Matched sample Matched sample
(3)
(4)
0.0002
(0.0006)
−0.0002
(0.0006)
−0.0018***
(0.0006)
0.0001
(0.0006)
0.0048***
(0.0007)
−0.0005
(0.0007)
0.0017***
(0.0004)

0.0004
(0.0005)
0.0002
(0.0005)
−0.0014**
(0.0006)
0.0006
(0.0006)
0.0054***
(0.0006)
0.0005
(0.0007)
0.0018***
(0.0004)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

9,448,457
0.049
0.15

9,448,457
0.049
0.15

6,261,055
0.048
0.18

6,261,055
0.048
0.18

0.0104
0.0000

0.0055
0.0000

0.0047
0.0000

0.0048
0.0000

Notes: This table reports estimates of probit specification (1) using data on Hybrid 2/28 ARMs. The dependent
variable takes the value of one when a loan becomes 60 days past due in a given month, conditional upon being
current 60 days earlier, and is equal to zero otherwise. Column 1 estimates the model using the base sample and
includes only time dummies, a Countrywide dummy that equals one if the loan is serviced by Countrywide, and
interactions between the Countrywide and time dummies. The excluded category is July–September 2007, the first
quarter of our analysis period. Column 2 adds indicators for the quarter of origination and additional controls from
the BlackBox data, including a wide range of loan and borrower-level characteristics, such as origination LTV,
origination FICO and CLTV (when available), and their interactions with time dummies, initial interest rate, current interest rate, reset controls capturing the timing of reset, and MSA fixed effects for the location of the property
backing the loan. Columns 3 and 4 use the matched sample instead of the base sample. Column 3 includes the same
controls as in column 2; column 4 includes additional Equifax controls, such as current CLTV, credit card utilization, and current credit scores (Vantage) and their change over time. Coefficients reported are marginal effects from
a probit regression; standard errors are in parentheses; standard errors are clustered at the loan ID.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.

The time dummies identify the quarters before and after the settlement announcement. The excluded category is Jul–Sept 2007, the first quarter of our analysis
period. The final time dummy—Jan–Feb 2009—includes only two months because
we stop our analysis in February 2009, the month before HAMP was announced.
These Countrywide × Time interactions allow us to assess variation in the relative
default rates of Countrywide and control group loans before and after the settlement
announcement.
The coefficients are marginal effects and can be compared to the mean monthly
rollover rate among Countrywide loans during the Jul–Sep 2008 period, as reported
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at the bottom of the table (“Avg. delinquency”).25 In order to facilitate a direct assessment of the change in rollover rates between the quarters before (Jul–Sep 2008) and
after (Oct–Dec 2008) the announcement, the bottom of the table also reports the
magnitude and statistical significance of the difference between the estimated interactions, Countrywide × Jul–Sep 2008 and Countrywide × Oct–Dec 2008.
Column 2 adds additional controls from the BlackBox database. These controls
include a wide range of loan- and borrower-level characteristics, such as origination FICO, initial LTV and CLTV (when available), current LTV, initial interest
rate, and any change in rate over time. Column 2 also includes MSA fixed effects,26
dummies that identify loans that had reset within the preceding three or six months,
and interactions between these reset variables and the Countrywide dummy. These
variables account for heterogeneity across loans and systematic differences between
Countrywide and the control group, including the possibility that Countrywide
mortgages experienced higher default rates at rate resets or during other time periods. Columns 3 and 4 analyze the matched sample: column 3 includes the same
controls as in column 2; column 4 includes the set of Equifax controls, including
information about second liens, credit card utilization, and current credit scores.
Column 4 also uses current and origination CLTV.
Across all columns in Table 2, the Countrywide × Oct–Dec 2008 interaction is
positive, statistically significant, and economically meaningful. Controlling for borrower and loan characteristics, the estimates imply a 0.48 to 0.54 percentage point
absolute increase in the monthly rollover rate of Countrywide loans, relative to the
control group, during the quarter following the settlement announcement. This represents a 10 to 11 percent increase in Countrywide’s rollover rate relative to the
average rate among Countrywide loans during the quarter immediately prior to the
announcement (4.8 percent, as reported at the bottom of the table).27 Because the
magnitude of the effect does not vary meaningfully across columns 2 through 4, we
conclude that restricting our attention to the matched sample with a full set of controls does not bias our inference.
As the unconditional mean default rates reported in Figure 4, the estimates in
Table 2 point to a potential pre-settlement increase in Countrywide’s rollover
rate relative to the control group. In column 1, the coefficient for Countrywide ×
Jul–Sep 2008 is substantial and statistically significant. When we add controls that
account for heterogeneity in borrower and loan characteristics, the magnitude of
this coefficient becomes much smaller and its significance disappears. The controls that substantially reduce this coefficient are those that account for the current
interest rate and its reset date, the current CLTV of the loan, and the borrower’s
current credit score (See Table A.2 in the online Appendix). This confirms what
we saw in the univariate statistics: there are some differences in the composition
25
The estimated treatment effect in nonlinear difference-in-differences probit models such as ours is given by the
incremental effect of the coefficient of the interaction term (see Kremer and Snyder 2010; Puhani 2012).
26
In unreported regressions, we obtained virtually identical results when we included both State dummies and
State × Time interactions.
27
These estimates compare the quarter immediately after the announcement (the fourth quarter of 2008) to
the first quarter of our analysis period (the third quarter of 2007). At the bottom of the table, we present estimates
comparing the quarter immediately after to the quarter immediately before (third quarter of 2008). The results are
similar: Estimates range from 0.48 to 0.55 percentage points, again representing a 10 to 11 percent increase relative
to the rollover rate during the third quarter of 2008.
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of Countrywide and control group loans, especially with respect to high-risk
loans. When we include a full battery of controls in column 4, all pre-settlement
Countrywide × Time interactions are insignificant and small in magnitude except
for the Countrywide × Apr–Jun 2008 interaction, which is marginally significant,
negative, and small in magnitude.
Table 2 also shows that the settlement effect is concentrated in the first quarter following its announcement. There is no apparent effect during Jan–Feb 2009.
This pattern may reflect the way information about the Countrywide settlement was
transmitted to borrowers. It was announced through media channels in early October
2008 (Countrywide subsequently sent letters to borrowers beginning in December
2008). If only a subset of Countrywide borrowers received news of the settlement,
and responded quickly, we might not observe an effect in early 2009. In Section V
we discuss the economic importance of our estimates and their implications.
Overall, this evidence is consistent with our analysis of mean rollover rates from
the previous section: we find a substantial increase in the relative default rate of
Countrywide loans immediately after the settlement. Although we also observe a
pre-settlement relative increase in the Countrywide default rate, this effect disappears when we control for loan characteristics.
C. Settlement Effects by Credit Card Utilization and CLTV
The baseline results displayed in Table 2 report a marked post-settlement increase
in the rollover rate of Countrywide loans relative to the control group. This could
reflect strategic behavior, or it could reflect an increase in defaults by economically
distressed borrowers who were already highly likely to default in the near term.
We address this concern by identifying subsets of borrowers who were unlikely to
default in the absence of the settlement.
We stratify our sample by levels of credit card utilization and CLTV (both measured monthly). With respect to utilization, we identify three groups: borrowers with access to credit equal to more than five months of mortgage payments
(“> 5 Months”), those with available credit equal to one to five months of payments
(“1–5 Months”), and those with available credit equal to no more the one payment
(“0–1 Months”). We hypothesize that borrowers with high levels of available credit
(e.g., “> 5 Months”) are likely to be less liquidity constrained and therefore less vulnerable to economic shocks than borrowers with lower levels of available credit.28
We similarly separate borrowers into three groups based on current CLTV: borrowers with CLTV less than 100 (“above water”), those with CLTV between 100 and
120, and those with CLTV greater than 120 (“underwater”). Again, we hypothesize
that borrowers with CLTV under 100 are less likely to default because they have positive home equity. Finally, we identify a group of borrowers who had high a vailable
credit (“> 5 Months”), but were underwater on their homes (“CLTV > 100”). These
homeowners are often thought to be the most likely to engage in strategic behavior.

28
In unreported regressions we verify that our results are robust to different definitions of credit utilization. We
reran our regressions separately on borrowers with zero to one month, one to two months, two to four months, four
to six months, and six to twelve months of available credit. Consistent with Table 3, we find that the post-settlement
relative increase in rollover rates among Countrywide loans is larger among borrowers with greater available credit.
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Table 3—Default Specification for 2/28 ARMs by Current Credit Utilization and CLTV

120
≤ CLTV
(6)

> 5 months
and CLTV
> 100
(7)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

1,994,158
0.16
0.031

1,715,891
0.18
0.039

1,067,641
0.19
0.078

611,797
0.20
0.040

0.0048

0.0041

0.0049

0.0069

0.006

0.0001

0.0010

0.0000

0.0001

0.0000

>5
months
(1)

1–5
months
(2)

0–1
months
(3)

CLTV <
100
(4)

100
≤ CLTV
< 120
(5)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Observations
1,210,922
Avg. share Countrywide 0.18
Avg. Countrywide
0.030
2008:III delinquency

1,639,789
0.19
0.041

1,748,890
0.18
0.052

Countrywide ×
(2008:IV–2008:III)
Wald Test ( p-value)

0.0043

0.0034

0.0000

0.0019

Countrywide ×
Oct–Dec 2007
Countrywide ×
Jan–Mar 2008
Countrywide ×
Apr–Jun 2008
Countrywide ×
Jul–Sep 2008
Countrywide ×
Oct–Dec 2008
Countrywide ×
Jan–Feb 2009
Countrywide
Origination quarter
BlackBox control
MSA control
Reset control
Equifax control

0.0008
0.0011
−0.0004
−0.0001
−0.0011
(0.0008)
(0.0009)
(0.0005)
(0.0006)
(0.0008)
0.0012
0.0008
0.0013
−0.0001
−0.0008
(0.0009)
(0.0009)
(0.0005)
(0.0006)
(0.0008)
0.0003
−0.0014
−0.0014
−0.0009
−0.0032***
(0.0007)
(0.0009)
(0.0010)
(0.0007)
(0.0008)
0.0011
0.0018
0.0015
0.0009
−0.0011
(0.0008)
(0.0010)
(0.0011)
(0.0008)
(0.0009)
0.0054*** 0.0052*** 0.0063*** 0.0050*** 0.0038***
(0.0011)
(0.0012)
(0.0013)
(0.0011)
(0.0012)
0.0002
0.0009
0.0015
0.0049*** −0.0004
(0.0009)
(0.0012)
(0.0014)
(0.0014)
(0.0011)
0.0011
0.0025*** 0.0005
0.0040***
−0.0001
(0.0005)
(0.0007)
(0.0008)
(0.0004)
(0.0007)

−0.0059
(0.0035)
−0.0054
(0.0034)
−0.0055
(0.0033)
0.0007
(0.0031)
0.0076
(0.0039)
−0.0029
(0.0035)
0.0078**
(0.0035)

−0.0026
(0.0016)
−0.0006
(0.0016)
−0.0024
(0.0015)
−0.0011
(0.0015)
0.0049**
(0.0021)
−0.0028
(0.0017)
0.0025
(0.0016)

Notes: This table reports estimates of probit specification (1) for Hybrid 2/28 ARMs, but stratifies the Matched
Sample by borrowers current credit utilization and CLTV. The models are estimated using the full set of BlackBox
and Equifax controls used in column 4 of Table 2. The dependent variable takes the value of one if the loan becomes
60 days past due in a given month, conditional upon being current 60 days earlier, and is equal to zero otherwise.
The excluded category is July–September 2007, the first quarter of our analysis period. Columns 1 through 3 separate borrowers by available credit card utilization, 4 through 6 separate them by CLTV, and 7 subsets on underwater
borrowers with high available credit utilization. Coefficients reported are marginal effects from a probit regression;
standard errors are in parentheses; standard errors are clustered at the loan ID.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.

Table 3 reruns our main specification with the full set of controls (column 4 in
Table 2) for each group of borrowers. Columns 1 through 3 separate borrowers
by credit card utilization, 4 through 6 separate them by CLTV, and 7 subsets on
underwater borrowers with high available utilization. As the bottom of the table
shows (“Avg. Countrywide 2008:III delinquency”) pre-settlement rollover rates are
substantially lower among borrowers with lower CLTVs and higher levels of available credit. These patterns are consistent with our hypothesis that, prior to the settlement, borrowers with substantial available credit and positive home equity were
substantially less likely to default than more credit-constrained or “underwater”
borrowers.
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Across columns 1 through 7, we observe a substantial post-settlement increase in
Countrywide’s relative rollover rate. Stratifying borrowers by credit card utilization,
columns 1 through 3 show that the relative effect of the settlement was largest among
borrowers with the most available credit. Among borrowers with “> 5 Months” of
available credit, Countrywide’s monthly rollover rate increased by 0.54 percentage
points. This represents an 18 percent increase relative to the pre-settlement rate.
Among borrowers in the “1–5 Months” and “0 –1 Months” categories, the estimates
represent 13 and 12 percent relative increases, respectively.29
We observe similar patterns when we stratify loans by CLTV in columns 4 through
6. Countrywide’s relative rollover rate increased by 0.50 percentage points among
“above-water” borrowers with CLTV < 100, a 16 percent increase compared to the
pre-settlement rollover rate. We also observe a relative increase in defaults during
January–February 2009 among borrowers with CLTV < 100.30 The estimates for
underwater borrowers—0.38 and 0.76 percentage point effects—represent 10 percent increases relative to the pre-settlement default rate (and the effect is only
marginally significant for borrowers with CLTV > 120).31 Column 7 of Table 3
provides evidence that the settlement induced an increase in Countrywide’s relative rollover rate among underwater borrowers with substantial available credit. The
0.49 percentage point effect translates into a 12 percent increase compared to the
pre-settlement delinquency rate among Countrywide loans.32
Overall, these results support our hypothesis that the settlement induced defaults
among borrowers who were unlikely to default otherwise, at least in the near future.
Equally important, as we look across the columns in Table 3, we do not find significant evidence of differential pre-settlement default patterns. This is consistent with
our previous findings, which indicate that these patterns are driven by Countrywide
high-risk loans and that, once we control for these loans or consider a more homogenous sample of mortgages, these patterns are no longer evident.
D. Effects of the Settlement on Nontargeted Debts
The settlement targeted subprime first lien mortgages. We do not expect to observe
an increase in defaults among nontargeted debts—such as second lien mortgages
and credit card debt—in response to the settlement. Similarly, we do not expect
the settlement announcement to affect default behavior of borrowers who were not
eligible for benefits, such as borrowers with non-subprime mortgages. Although the
29
The magnitude of the post-settlement increase is slightly smaller when we compute the estimated change
between the quarters immediately before and after the settlement. As reported at the bottom of Table 3, the absolute
increase is 0.43 percentage points among borrowers with “> 5 Months” of available credit, a 14 percent increase
relative to the pre-settlement mean. Among borrowers in the other categories, the increase is smaller—an 8 percent increase among borrowers in the “1–5 Months” category and a 9 percent increase among borrowers in the
“0–1 Months” category.
30
Borrowers with lower CLTV levels may have taken more time to respond, possibly as their perceived cost of
strategic behavior was higher.
31
When we compute the difference between the estimated coefficients for Countrywide × Oct–Dec 2008 and
Countrywide × Jul–Sep 2008 (the quarters before and after the settlement), we obtain comparable results, as shown
at the bottom of Table 3. Among above-water borrowers, we observe a 13 percent increase in Countrywide’s relative
rollover rate compared to the pre-settlement mean. Borrowers with CLTV above 120 exhibit an increase of only
9 percent.
32
The effect is even larger—15 percent compared to the pre-settlement mean—when we compare the estimated
coefficients for Countrywide × Oct–Dec 2008 and Countrywide × Jul–Sep 2008, as the bottom of Table 3 shows.
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settlement offered relief to subprime fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) borrowers, the vast
majority of securitized FRMs in our data are non-subprime loans offered to borrowers with relatively high credit ratings. Because these n on-subprime FRMs were not
targeted by the settlement, they provide a useful placebo test.
Table 4 tests these hypotheses. Columns 1 and 2 reestimate our main specification, but change the dependent variable to measure the probability of being 60 days
past due on a second lien (column 1) or missing a payment on credit card debt (column 2), conditional upon being current two months earlier. Borrowers are included
in these regressions only if they have a second lien or credit card. Across both columns, we observe no effect of the settlement on the relative delinquency rate of
Countrywide borrowers, consistent with the hypothesis that the settlement did not
induce defaults on nontargeted debts.33
Columns 3 and 4 rerun these regressions on subsets of borrowers with high available credit (> 5 Months) and borrowers with above-water mortgages (CLTV < 100).
Although these borrowers had the lowest default rates on first mortgages prior to
the settlement announcement, as Table 3 showed, their rollover rates exhibited the
strongest response to the announcement. Yet we find no evidence that the settlement
increased delinquency rates on nontargeted debts among these borrowers, relative
to control group. To the contrary, column 4 shows that credit card delinquency rates
decreased among low utilization Countrywide borrowers, relative to the control
group, after the settlement announcement. This pattern suggests that some borrowers may have strategically defaulted on first mortgages and then used the additional
available cash flow to service credit card debts. With respect to second liens, we
observe a similar pattern, though the effects are not significant except in Jan–Feb
2009. These results suggest that the settlement may have induced behavior that
effectively reverses the priorities of first and second liens: Countrywide borrowers
continued making payments on lower-priority second liens loans while defaulting
on more senior loans.34
Finally, column 7 estimates our main specification using data on non-subprime
fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs). Again, we observe no increase in rollover rates among
Countrywide borrowers, relative to the control group, during the months following
the settlement announcement. Indeed, relative rollover rates appear to have declined
among these Countrywide borrowers during those months.35

33

This evidence also suggests that the delinquency induced by the Countrywide program did not shift the “moral
compass” of borrowers by encouraging them to default on other types of debt.
34
We also estimated a version of our main specification in which the dependent variable equals 1 if the borrower
becomes 60 days delinquent, conditional upon being current 2 months earlier, while remaining current on credit
cards for at least 6 months following the month in which he or she becomes 60 days delinquent. This dependent variable measures a type of default behavior—defaulting on first mortgages while remaining current on other debts—
that others have described as “strategic behavior.” We observe a substantial increase in this type of default among
Countrywide borrowers, relative to the control group during the quarter following the settlement announcement.
The effect is larger when we subset on borrowers with more available credit or those with above-water mortgages.
35
We have also investigated the program response among Countrywide subprime FRMs that were targeted by
the settlement. For that purpose, we define an FRM loan as subprime if the borrower’s origination FICO was less
than 620. We find some evidence that Countrywide subprime FRMs experienced a relative increase in delinquency
rates after the announcement, but our estimates are imprecise because we have only about 10,000 Countrywide
subprime FRMs in our data (compared to more than 130,000 non-subprime FRMs).
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Table 4—Default Specifications for Other Debt Types
CLTV < 100

5+ months utilization

Countrywide × Oct–Dec 2007

2nd
lien
(1)

Credit
card
(2)

2nd
lien
(3)

Credit
card
(4)

2nd
lien
(5)

Credit
card
(6)

0.0002
(0.0008)

−0.0016
(0.0012)

−0.0011
(0.0012)

−0.0026
(0.0017)

0.0001
(0.0006)

−0.0009
(0.0020)

Countrywide × Apr–Jun 2008 −0.0000
(0.0000)

0.0004
(0.0015)

−0.0018
(0.0010)

−0.0022
(0.0020)

−0.0002
(0.0010)

0.0013
(0.0030)

−0.0047**
(0.0021)

−0.0002
(0.0012)

0.0033**
(0.0014)

0.0033
(0.0017)

Countrywide × Jan–Mar 2008

Countrywide × Jul–Sep 2008

0.0012
(0.0009)

0.0009
(0.0014)

−0.0009
(0.0011)

−0.0030
(0.0018)

0.0004
(0.0008)

−0.0001
(0.0007)

−0.0016
(0.0011)

Countrywide × Jan–Feb 2009 −0.0003
(0.0081)

−0.0016
(0.0019)

−0.0031*** −0.0033
(0.0010)
(0.0026)

Countrywide × Oct–Dec 2008

Countrywide

Origination quarter
BlackBox control
MSA control
Reset control
Equifax control
Observations
Avg. share Countrywide
Avg. Countrywide
2008:III delinquency
Countrywide ×
(2008:IV–2008:III)
Wald Test ( p-value)

0.0004
(0.0009)

−0.0018
(0.0016)

0.0018** −0.0014
(0.0008)
(0.0012)

−0.0018
(0.0011)

−0.0016
(0.0020)

0.0011
(0.0011)

0.0039
(0.0025)

0.0013
(0.0014)

−0.0000
(0.0000)

0.0017
(0.0019)

0.0071
(0.0051)

Nonsubprime
FRM
(7)
0.0000
(0.0000)

0.0003***
(0.0000)
0.0003***
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0000)

0.0011
(0.0037)

−0.0002***
(0.0000)

0.0001
(0.0005)

−0.0026
(0.0018)

0.0004***
(0.0000)

−0.0002***
(0.0000)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

1,906,151
0.20
0.028

3,230,307
0.18
0.073

525,191
0.21
0.021

903,902
0.18
0.045

265,800
0.18
0.010

870,999
0.16
0.082

8,920,874
0.30
0.0090

0.0000

−0.0017

−0.0002

−0.0031

−0.0015

0.0011

0.28

0.83

0.12

0.31

0.94

0.77

−0.0002
0.0000

Notes: This table reports estimates from models similar to probit specification (1), but with the dependent variable measuring delinquency on loans that were not targeted by the settlement. The models are estimated using the
matched sample and the full set of BlackBox and Equifax controls used in column 4 of Table 2. In column 1 below,
the dependent variable equals one if the borrower becomes 60 days past due on a second lien, conditional upon
being current two months earlier, and equals zero otherwise. In column 2, the dependent variable equals one if the
borrower becomes delinquent on credit card debt, conditional upon being current two months earlier, and equals
zero otherwise. Columns 3–6 show the corresponding results after subsetting on borrowers with low credit utilization (columns 3 and 4) and CLTV < 100 (columns 5 and 6). Column 7 uses data on borrowers with fixed-rate
mortgages (FRMs). The dependent variable equals one if the borrower becomes 60 days past due on a FRM, conditional upon being current two months earlier, and equals zero otherwise. Across all columns, the excluded category
is July–September 2007, the first quarter of our analysis period. Coefficients reported are marginal effects from a
probit regression; standard errors are in parentheses; standard errors are clustered at the loan ID.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.

E. Additional Robustness Checks
Extending the Analysis Period.—In the foregoing analysis, we analyze default
rates until February 2009, but do not consider data from subsequent months in order
to avoid the potential confound created by the HAMP program. The downside of
this approach is that it leaves open the possibility that the settlement merely accelerated defaults that would have happened later in time. If that were true, the relative
increase in Countrywide’s rollover rate in fourth quarter 2008 should be offset by
relative decreases in subsequent quarters. We explore this possibility by e xtending
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our analysis through December 2009. We observe a relative increase in the estimated Countrywide’s rollover rate immediately after the settlement announcement, as reflected in the Countrywide × Oct–Dec 2008 interaction, but none of
the subsequent Countrywide × Quarter interactions is negative and significant (see
Figure A.4 in the online Appendix). This is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the
settlement merely accelerated defaults that would have occurred anyway in the near
term. Instead, these results indicate that the settlement induced a net increase in the
stock of delinquent Countrywide loans and that this increase did not quickly reverse
itself over time.
Alternative Modeling Strategies.—Our empirical strategy models the probability
that a loan becomes 60 days delinquent in month t, conditional upon being current
in month t − 2. Because of this restriction, we are not estimating a standard hazard
model. As we discussed above, we chose this specification because we believe that
evidence of strategic behavior is more compelling if we observe a relative increase
in Countrywide borrowers who abruptly defaulted on their loans but were current on
their payments before they received news of the settlement. This specification also
subsets on a relatively homogeneous group of borrowers, all of whom were current
two months before the month of interest.
We confirmed, however, that a standard hazard model yields comparable results.
Following Grogger and Bronars (2001) and DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios (2002),
we estimated a version of our baseline specification—column 4 of Table 2—in which
the dependent variable equals 1 when a loan becomes 60 days delinquent (without
conditioning on being previously current). Once a loan becomes 60 days delinquent,
it drops out of our sample. We account for possible duration dependence by including
dummies for origination quarter and current quarter (which were already included
in our baseline specification) and by including controls for loan age and loan age
squared. This specification is a discrete-time hazard model. Estimating this specification, we find that Countrywide loans exhibit a relative increase in the hazard of being
60 days delinquent immediately after the settlement announcement. The magnitudes
are similar to those reported in Table 2 (see Figure A.5 in the online Appendix).36
Alternative Control Groups.—Our empirical strategy treats all non-Countrywide
loans as a control group. It is possible that our analysis is confounded by d ifferential
changes in default trends among particular loan servicers within the control group.
To address this possibility, we reran our main specification—column 4 of Table 2—
but included dummies that identify loans serviced by the top five non-Countrywide
servicers and interacted these dummies with pre- and post-settlement time dummies. The remaining loans were left in the control group. Although we continue
to find a strong effect of the settlement among Countrywide loans, we observe no
impact among loans serviced by the top five non-Countrywide Servicers, supporting our empirical design. As an additional placebo test, we reran our specification, but dropped Countrywide loans and replaced the Countrywide indicator with
an indicator for loans serviced by Wells Fargo, the second largest servicer in our
36

We obtain similar results when we reestimate this specification using a complementary log-log regression,
which is equivalent to a discrete-time proportional hazard model.
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dataset. We find no meaningful p ost-settlement increase in the relative default rate
among Wells Fargo loans.
Alternative Approaches to Time-Varying Effects.—Our estimates in Table 2
report an average settlement effect across all loan vintages. The settlement, however, could have impacted some loan vintages differently than others. For example,
it may have been most beneficial to borrowers experiencing interest rate resets
before or around the time the settlement was announced. To explore this possibility, we reran our main specification from Table 2 for each quarterly origination
cohort. Despite a relatively small sample size for each cohort, we observe a statistically significant p ost-settlement relative increase in the Countrywide default rate
both in cohorts that were resetting around the time of the settlement (2006:II and
2006:III) and in cohorts that reset more than a year before the settlement announcement (2005:I, 2005:II, and 2006:I). The effects range from more than 10 percent
to more than 20 percent compared to the pre-settlement delinquency rate among
Countrywide loans.
Additionally, our empirical specifications use quarterly time effects. This allows
us to estimate the settlement effect with greater power, avoiding some of the issues
associated with noisy variation in monthly default rates. We verified, however, that
our results are robust to the way we model time effects. For example, we reestimated
our main specification, but replaced the quarterly dummies with monthly dummies,
which were interacted with the Countrywide indicator. Consistent with our prior
results, we observe a substantial increase in Countrywide’s rollover rate during
November and December 2008 (see Figure A.6 in the online Appendix).
V. Conclusion

We investigate whether homeowners respond strategically to news of mortgage
modification programs by defaulting on their mortgages. We analyze a program that
used a simple eligibility criterion: A borrower becomes eligible upon default. We
find that this program induced an increase in defaults. The borrowers whose estimated default rates increased the most were those who appear to have been the least
likely to default otherwise.
“Back-of-the-envelope” calculations suggest that the estimated effects of strategic
behavior could be economically meaningful. Over 45 million first-lien mortgages
were outstanding and current in early 2007, when housing prices began to fall.37
Suppose lenders considered at that time whether to implement a national mortgage
modification program with simple eligibility criteria similar to the Countrywide settlement. The estimates in Table 2 imply that the Countrywide settlement resulted in
a 0.54 percentage point absolute increase in the monthly delinquency rate during the
quarter immediately after its announcement. This means that 1.62 percent of current
loans became delinquent during this quarter as a result of the settlement announcement. Applying that estimate (1.62 percent) to the stock of outstanding, current

37

Based on LPS and BlackBox databases.
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loans (45 million), a national program would immediately induce over 700,000
additional strategic defaults.38
If the typical loan modification offered debt relief equivalent to about 30 percent of a borrower’s outstanding loan balance (with an average balance of about
$200,000), strategic defaults would impose losses of over $43 billion on mortgage
lenders and investors (in terms of foregone payments from borrowers).39 If programs
with simple eligibility criteria have longer-run impacts on strategic default rates—
which we cannot assess due to the limits of our empirical setting—the losses would
be larger. On the other hand, we note that such long-term costs could also be lower
if some of the strategic defaulters would have defaulted anyway at some point in the
future. Likewise, because the Countrywide settlement compensated borrowers who
allegedly suffered deception, the borrowers may have felt entitled to take advantage
of the program in a way that wouldn’t occur in a program with different origin.
With these caveats in mind, we can use our rough cost estimate to explore the
potential trade-off facing mortgage lenders (and investors). Simple modification
programs can result in strategic behavior leading to unnecessary modifications. On
the other hand, if lenders try to avoid these losses by implementing slower programs
with more complex eligibility criteria, they may fail to prevent foreclosures that also
reduce payoffs to lenders (and homeowners). To illustrate this trade-off, assume that
a foreclosure results in losses to lenders equal to about 50 percent of the borrower’s
outstanding loan balance.40 Assume as well that foreclosures can be prevented by
offering homeowners debt relief equivalent to about 30 percent of their balances.
Unnecessary foreclosures, then, expose lenders to losses equal to 20 percent of the
borrower’s outstanding balance. Unnecessary modifications, by contrast, expose
them to losses equal to 30 percent of the borrower’s outstanding balance. A simple
calculation indicates that lenders would be indifferent between a quick program
generating over 700,000 unnecessary modifications and a slow program generating
over one million unnecessary foreclosures. Both programs generate the same costs
to lenders. This example suggests that concerns about strategic defaults may help
explain the relatively slow pace of mortgage modifications during the recent crisis.41
Could lenders alleviate costs of strategic behavior by using our proxies—high
available credit utilization and low current CLTV—to identify borrowers who are
more likely to be acting strategically in response to a mortgage modification program? There are a number of challenges in applying these proxies to design more
cost-effective modification programs. First, available utilization is manipulable:
Borrowers can strategically increase their credit utilization in order to qualify for
38
A similar increase in strategic defaults is implied by our estimates in Table 3, which subsets on less-risky
borrowers with relatively high remaining credit card utilization and lower CLTV ratios. This implies that our backof-the envelope calculations are unlikely to be biased by the relatively low average creditworthiness of Countrywide
borrowers.
39
We assume a loan modification equal to 30 percent of a borrower’s outstanding loan balance because home
prices fell over 30 percent after mid-2007, according to the Case-Shiller ten-city composite index (Sinai 2013). A
modification of the magnitude we contemplate here would allow most homeowners to become above-water on their
mortgages.
40
This loss arises from (i) the house price decline that has already occurred and (ii) the deadweight costs of the
foreclosure process.
41
There are other factors that could adversely affect mortgage renegotiation such as institutional frictions implied
by the high rate of securitization of loans at risk of foreclosure (see Piskorski, Seru, and Vig 2010 and Agrawal et
al. 2011) or limited ability of servicers to handle distressed loans (Agrawal et al. 2012).
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benefits. Second, although CLTV is less manipulable than utilization, it is harder
to verify and often measured with noise, particularly for homes that haven’t experienced recent transactions. As a result, a policy that makes benefits available only to
borrowers with high estimated CLTVs could prevent some eligible borrowers from
obtaining relief.42
The above rough calculations show that the costs associated with strategic
default—even if relatively small compared to the amount of mortgage debt outstanding—may be large enough to induce lenders to favor slower, more cautious
debt relief programs, which fail to prevent many foreclosures. Such foreclosures,
however, can yield negative externalities for surrounding communities, as illustrated by Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak (2011) and Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2011).
Additionally, debt-relief programs may mitigate the distorting effects of high household debt levels on aggregate demand, investment decisions, and employment (Mian
and Sufi 2012).
Our analysis does not necessarily imply that it would be socially optimal to incentivize or require lenders to implement generous modification programs. These programs could generate other costs or undesirable redistributional effects that we have
not studied here. Our results instead highlight a trade-off that merits further investigation: Mortgage modification policies that use simple but potentially manipulable eligibility criteria (i) do appear to generate economically meaningful strategic
behavior, but (ii) may also offer benefits more quickly and to a larger group of
homeowners at risk of default. More work must be done to assess the overall costs
and benefits of such modification policies both in the near term and in the long run.
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